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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been more than twenty years since the American Bar Associ-
ation published its pioneering study of the legal needs of low-income
Americans. The bottom lines of this study are often cited: first, that
each year, half of low-income people faced legal needs, defined as
“situations, events, or difficulties any member of the household faced
. . . . [that] raised legal issues.”1 Second, 70% of the legal needs of low-
income people went unmet.
Twenty years later, it appears that nothing has changed, except for
the worse. For one thing, the budget of the Legal Services Corpora-
tion (“LSC”) is 40% smaller today—in constant dollars—than it was
when the Legal Needs Study appeared.2 In fact, the LSC’s 2015
budget was 10% lower than it was just four years earlier.3 Today there
are about 4,300 LSC-funded lawyers—about the same as in 1994, the
† This Article was originally delivered as the keynote address to the Texas A&M
University School of Law’s conference “Reconsidering Access to Justice,” May 1,
2015. The present version aims to preserve the style of the spoken presentation. I am
grateful to Deborah Rhode, Tanina Rostain, Jon Tippens, Rob Vischer, David
Vladeck, David Wilkins, and participants at the conference for helpful comments and
conversations, and to Molly Wilder for research assistance.
* University Professor, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. A.B.A., LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS, MA-
JOR FINDINGS FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 2 (1994).
2. The 1994 funding, in 2013 dollars, was $628,763,924. 2013 LSC by the Num-
bers, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/media-center/publications/2013-lsc-
numbers#bfrtoc-funding [https://perma.cc/TU7L-5LXP] [hereinafter 2013 LSC by the
Numbers]. The 2015 funding was $375,000,000. LSC Funding, LEGAL SERVS. CORP.,
http://www.lsc.gov/lsc-funding [https://perma.cc/H3EB-8E3W].
3. 2013 LSC by the Numbers, supra note 2. The 2011 funding was $418,504,591.
Id.
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year of the ABA’s legal needs survey.4 This actually improved over
the intervening years, when the number of LSC-funded lawyers
dropped significantly.5 But the number of people eligible for legal aid
has grown by 11 million since 1994 to a rather staggering 61 million
people today, almost a fifth of the U.S. population.6
Of course, LSC is only part of the legal aid story, but other parts are
no less grim. The economic crisis devastated alternative sources of
funding for legal assistance. States have cut their legal aid budgets, law
firms have pulled back their contributions, and low interest rates have
devastated Interest on Lawyer Trust Account (“IOLTA”) programs.
Nor do pro bono and “low bono” services fill the unmet legal need,
although by one estimate lawyers provide a quarter of a billion dol-
lars’ worth of pro bono service annually.7 The rapid restructuring of
the legal services market has, notoriously, put lawyers under huge per-
sonal stress. Lawyers are working harder, or so it feels, to stay in
place—and lawyers report that lack of time is the biggest factor dis-
couraging them from pro bono representation. An American Lawyer
study found a 12% drop in reported pro bono hours between 2008 and
2011 within AmLaw 200 firms—and not coincidentally, these were the
roughest years of the economic crisis.8 To be sure, the most recent
ABA study found that on average the legal profession somewhat ex-
ceeds the fifty hours per year of pro bono work that ethics rules rec-
ommend, and that most pro bono hours go to persons of limited
means or to organizations serving them.9 But while that finding gives
the private bar some bragging rights, we must take it with a grain of
salt. The findings are based on self-reports, and fewer than 1% of
those who received the ABA’s questionnaire responded to it. It seems
more than likely that the small minority responding to the pro bono
4. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., 2014 LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION BY THE NUMBERS
2 (2015), http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/attach/2015/08/LSC2014FactBook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/522V-J6YZ]. In addition to the 4,318 attorneys, LSC grantees were
staffed with 1,504 paralegals. Id. For the 1994 number, see LSC Grantee Staffing
1990–2000, at 35 (copy on file with author).
5. Id. In 2013, LSC-funded attorneys numbered only 3,071. 2013 LSC by the
Numbers, supra note 2 (reporting 2,623 staff attorneys and 448 supervising attorneys).
6. People Below 125 Percent of Poverty Level and the Near Poor, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/historical/hstpov6.xls [per
ma.cc/B9XG-FN2G]. The 61,339,000 people under 125% of the poverty line (the legal
aid cutoff) in 2014 represent 19.4% of the population. Id.
7. Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service and Market-Reliant Legal
Aid, in PRIVATE LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 95, 96–98 (Robert Granfield &
Lynn Mather eds., 2009).
8. Scott L. Cummings & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Beyond the Numbers: What We
Know—And Should Know—About American Pro Bono, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
83, 109–10 (2013).
9. STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO & PUB. SERV., A.B.A., SUPPORTING JUSTICE
III: A REPORT ON THE PRO BONO WORK OF AMERICA’S LAWYERS vi (Mar. 2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/probono_public_service/
ls_pb_Supporting_Justice_III_final.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9VH-
96UV].
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survey do more pro bono than the vast majority who do not respond,
so the results are likely to be skewed upward. Yet even if the number
is reliable—or rather, precisely if it is reliable—it suggests that we can-
not realistically expect lawyers to make up for the current shortfall by
doing even more pro bono. The pro bono average is never going to go
from fifty hours to seventy-five or 100.
The same economic crisis that has drained the well of legal aid re-
sources has provided an ocean of new legal needs. This is the double
whammy of economic crisis: more need, fewer resources to meet it.
The most conspicuous need the crisis generated is that of the millions
of Americans who face foreclosures, personal bankruptcy, and ruin-
ous levels of personal debt. More than five million people have al-
ready lost their homes, and millions more stand at the brink.10
These are precisely the kind of financial catastrophes that are at the
same time legal needs. As the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)
documents, the large debt-purchase industry has bought, at heavy dis-
counts, vast amounts of so-called “zombie” debt—debts that creditors
are not actually legally entitled to collect. Unsurprisingly, the industry
pursues these debts through means that are often illegal: frivolous
lawsuits about which consumers often receive inadequate notice, im-
proper garnishments, suing or threatening to sue on time-barred
debts, and unethical arbitration practices.11 These are issues crying out
for legal assistance, but it is mostly unavailable to debtors, neither
through legal aid or pro bono, nor through the private market for le-
gal services. I single out this issue from many I might have mentioned,
both because ruinous debt affects millions, and because it is a more-
or-less direct product of the same economic crisis that has put the
crunch on legal services—the double whammy mentioned above,
where the recession made legal need balloon at the same time it
shrank the resources for meeting that need. I will come back to the
subject of zombie debt later.
Apparently, then, the access to justice crisis is the same as it ever
was, only more so. Or is it? To me, the conversation about legal need
and access to justice seems different today than it did a decade ago, let
alone three decades ago when I first began to read and write about it.
Two comparatively new components have made the access to justice
story more complex.
One might be called the “discourse of skepticism.” By skepticism I
do not mean the familiar political attacks that have dogged legal ser-
10. David C. Vladeck, Debt’s Dilemmas: ACCI’s Annual Colston Warne Lecture,
47 J. CONSUMER AFF. 358, 359 (2013).
11. FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUM-
ERS IN DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION ii (July 2010), https://www
.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-bureau-con-
sumer-protection-staff-report-repairing-broken-system-protecting/debtcollectionre
port.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R6P-DPC9].
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vices for decades and are largely responsible for shrinking and hand-
cuffing the LSC. The skepticism I have in mind comes from friends,
not enemies, of the access to justice movement—friends who study
the system empirically and coolly, and have come to doubt that lack of
lawyers and lack of funding make a lot of difference in the real world.
Professor Milan Markovic’s recent paper Juking Access to Justice is
a skilled and thoughtful example of this skepticism.12 Markovic fo-
cuses on two important recent findings. The first comes from Rebecca
Sandefur’s recent study, conducted under the auspices of the Ameri-
can Bar Foundation, of civil legal needs in a Midwestern city.13 An
astonishing two-thirds of those surveyed had experienced a serious
civil justice situation in the past eighteen months, and half that group
suffered severe effects from it, including bad physical health. Yet only
about a fifth of them sought third-party assistance. That is discourag-
ing, but perhaps not surprising.
More surprising is that cost was not what drove them away. In fact,
Sandefur’s subjects reported that cost was a factor only 17% of the
time when they chose not to seek third-party assistance. More often,
they reported either that they did not seek help because the situation
would resolve itself, or because third-party help would make no differ-
ence. It appears that their problem of access to justice is not primarily
a money problem.
The second source Markovic draws on is one of the most significant
contributions to the skeptical literature, the landmark studies of law-
yer efficacy by Greiner and Pattanayak (with third co-author Jonathan
Hennessy in the later studies).14 The first and best-known involved
clients who applied to Harvard’s Legal Aid Bureau for help appealing
unemployment insurance eligibility decisions. For experimental pur-
poses, they were divided into two groups at random (call them the
treated group and the control group) and only those in the treated
12. Milan Markovic, Juking Access to Justice, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS (forth-
coming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2561558 [https://per
ma.cc/CV7D-K4NE].
13. REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, ACCESSING JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY USA:
FINDINGS FROM THE COMMUNITY NEEDS AND SERVICES STUDY (2014), http://www
.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/sandefur_accessing_justice_in_
the_contemporary_usa._aug._2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/RED4-QFQZ].
14. Markovic, supra note 12; D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak,
Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation
(Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118 (2012) [hereinafter Greiner &
Pattanayak, Legal Aid Bureau Study]; D. James Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pat-
tanayak & Jonathan Hennessy, The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Ran-
domized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126
HARV. L. REV. 901 (2013) [hereinafter District Court Study]; D. James Greiner, Cas-
sandra Wolos Pattanayak & Jonathan Hennessy, How Effective Are Limited Legal
Services Programs? A Randomized Experiment in a Massachusetts Housing Court
(Sept. 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=1880078 [https://perma.cc/57MT-VB7H] [hereinafter Greiner, Pattanayak &
Hennessy, Housing Court Study].
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group were offered legal aid.15 The research question was: Who fared
better, clients in the treated group, who received offers of legal aid, or
those in the control group, who did not? Greiner and Pattanayak
found there was simply no difference. Those in the control group ei-
ther represented themselves or in some instances found alternative
representation. In fact, the only difference in outcomes was that on
average they got their cases resolved faster than those in the treated
group. In other words, even though the treated group members were
represented by top-notch, highly committed law students from one of
the best legal clinics in the country, the main effect of the representa-
tion was a delay in getting clients their money.16
It looks like not only do people not report being priced out of legal
services, but in some contexts, those services might make no differ-
ence or even a difference in the wrong direction. If we take the dis-
course of skepticism at full face value, much of the access to justice
debate about how to provide more funding for lawyers is simply ask-
ing the wrong question.
Alongside the discourse of skepticism is a second recent strand,
what I’ll call the “discourse of technological optimism” or simply the
“discourse of optimism” for short. This is the view that new technolo-
gies are revolutionizing the delivery of legal services to such a degree
that we might foresee a technical fix to many access-to-justice
problems. A great deal of legal services are routine, and digital tech-
nology is extremely good at routines. Perhaps in the near future it will
not take a killer advocate to help clients, merely a killer app.
A moment’s thought shows that the discourse of optimism is, in its
own way, also a form of skepticism about lawyers. Like the discourse
of skepticism, it raises doubts about whether focusing on lawyers is a
misplaced emphasis in the analysis of access to justice.
Before probing more deeply into the discourse of skepticism and
the discourse of optimism, it will help to back up—very far up—and
try to draw a conceptual map of what, exactly, access to justice is sup-
posed to mean. That will help us see where skepticism and optimism
belong on the map.
When scholars and activists in the public-interest community talk
about “access to justice,” they usually have in mind access to lawyers.
The recent movement for civil Gideon makes that pretty obvious. Al-
though I titled my first book Lawyers and Justice, and argued for the
indispensible role of lawyers in pursuing justice, it seems that the
equivalence is by no means an analytic truth. It actually rests on a trio
of other supposed equivalences:
15. This was not ethically problematic, because the Legal Aid Bureau receives
more applications than it can handle—thus, applicants for legal aid would inevitably
be turned away with or without the experiment.
16. Greiner & Pattanayak, Legal Aid Bureau Study, supra note 14.
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(1) Access to justice means access to law—that is, to legal justice.
(2) Access to law means access to professional legal services.
(3) Access to professional legal services means access to lawyers.
Of course, students of the “access to justice” issue do not invariably
treat these as equivalences. Indeed, as I will explain, the discourses of
skepticism and optimism come precisely from questioning some of
these equivalences. It behooves us, then, to look at the equivalences
with some care. To what extent are they valid?
For the moment let’s postpone the biggest and most philosophically
deep of the equivalences—that between law and justice. First, let’s
look at the other two.
II. ACCESS TO LAW = ACCESS TO PROFESSIONAL
LEGAL SERVICES?
Let’s start with the supposed equivalence between access to law and
access to professional legal services, perhaps provided by lawyers but
perhaps by alternative providers. To question this equivalence is to
question whether human beings are essential for access to justice. If
not humans, then what? The answer given by optimists is that new
technologies can take over the burden. What if it turns out that intelli-
gent machines can do as well or even better at routine legal services
than human providers? In that case, access to law would not require
professional legal services nearly as often as we sometimes suppose.
Of course, machines cannot be advocates, at least not outside of
science fiction. But advocacy is not the main thing lawyers do. After
all, a lot of routine legal need consists primarily of the need for legal
information, and we can already Google an astonishing amount of
that. Of course, it is one thing to Google the information and another
to understand it or to process it in a way that’s practically useful. But
technology might be able to make those interpretive chores easier—
perhaps even as easy as a living, breathing legal professional, be it a
lawyer or a paralegal, could make it.
One class of cases for which that may be true consists of those
where professional advisors are simply going through a checklist. Why
not substitute a smart computer? A paradigm example is TurboTax
and its equivalents. The software asks you questions, and you fill in
the answers. Sometimes, there will be a node in the decision tree,
where the next line of questions depends on what you answered previ-
ously. That’s not a problem: computers are grandmasters of decision
trees. A living, breathing tax preparer would need to ask the same
questions, in roughly the same order, and would calculate your taxes
based on the answers in much the way the software does. It is just that
the software does it better.
How many routine but very pressing legal services are TurboTax-
like in the relevant ways? A lot, as it turns out. In my neck of the
2016] OPTIMISM, SKEPTICISM, & ACCESS TO JUSTICE 501
woods, Georgetown students in a practicum taught by my colleague
Tanina Rostain have built a number of ingenious access-to-justice
apps.
• They built a New York City “Earned Sick Time Advisor” that
instructs claimants how to calculate and claim their sick leave
under a New York City statute.17
• They made an app to help small businesses figure out how to
comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act.18
• To help pro se clients in unemployment benefits hearings, they
built an Unemployment Benefits Hearing Coach app; and a simi-
lar app helps parents prepare for hearings with school administra-
tors tailoring Individualized Education Programs.19
• A Pennsylvania Children’s Medicaid Appeals Advisor gives per-
sonalized guidance to parents, and helps them generate a custom-
ized letter to initiate their appeal.20
• A Debt & Eviction Navigator app helps social workers advise the
home-bound elderly who face evictions and consumer debt.21
• The Baltimore lawyer Jon Tippens has built a Criminal Record
Expungement app, which allows individuals with records to find
out in minutes whether they are eligible to have their record ex-
punged, and tells them what to do next.22
• Tippens and his colleagues have also constructed an app to help
Baltimoreans facing tax sale and foreclosure on their property.23
17. New York City Earned Sick Time Advisor, A BETTER BALANCE, https://appli-
cations.neotalogic.com/a/nyc-sicktime [https://perma.cc/9LUX-RV35]. It also appears
on the page of legal resources made available online by the NGO A Better Balance.
Documents & Resources–Sick Leave, A BETTER BALANCE, http://www.abetterbalance
.org/web/news/resources/sickleavedocs [https://perma.cc/Z62H-2DZ7].
18. See Terry Carter, Professor Tanina Rostain Has Her Students Developing Ac-
cess-to-Justice Apps, LEGAL REBELS (Sept. 23, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.abajournal
.com/legalrebels/article/tanina_rostain_profile [https://perma.cc/T4Y2-KD56].
19. See Unemployment Benefits Hearing Coach, DC OFF. ADMIN. HEARINGS,
https://applications.neotalogic.com/a/oah-advisor [https://perma.cc/NZ76-93AQ]; see
also Student-Designed Apps Provide Access to Justice, GEO. L. (Apr. 28, 2014), https://
www.law.georgetown.edu/news/web-stories/student-designed-apps-provide-access-to-
justice.cfm [https://perma.cc/39UH-HFYY].
20. See Pennsylvania Children’s Medicaid Appeals Advisor, PA. HEALTH LAW
PROJECT, https://applications.neotalogic.com/a/phlp-appeals-advisor (last visited Feb.
8, 2016).
21. See DEN: Debt & Eviction Navigator, JASA, https://applications.neotalo
gic.com/a/jasa-den [https://perma.cc/5JMG-N74]; see also Student-Designed Apps Pro-
vide Access to Justice, supra note 19.
22. It’s Time for a Do-Over, EXPUNGEMARYLAND, http://www.expungemaryland
.org/ [https://perma.cc/2SFN-UAH2].
23. Welcome to Tax Sale Help Baltimore!, MD TAX SALE APP, http://www.tax-
salehelpbaltimore.org/ [https://perma.cc/83EA-XVVZ].
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Both the University of Richmond and Vanderbilt University have sim-
ilar initiatives.24
Other apps can improve quality and efficiency of legal services that
lawyers deliver—machine and human working side by side in synergy.
Rostain and her students built an intake and assessment app to help
Virginia Legal Services do intake triage,25 and are currently building
another app to assist veterans benefits administrators to make com-
plex legal determinations.26 That turns out to be a crying need, be-
cause audits show that unassisted administrators currently get it wrong
one time out of four. We can readily imagine an app that would help
criminal defenders evaluate the collateral consequences of pleading
guilty to crimes that might lead to deportation, loss of jobs, or loss of
licenses—consequences buried in unrelated statutes across all fifty
states, and which defense lawyers will almost certainly never notice.
In each of these, a user-friendly app can walk you through the deci-
sion tree and give you a reasonable facsimile of the kind of legal ad-
vice you would get from a professional. If the apps are free or cheap,
they could, in principle, take over much of the role of human provid-
ers and provide low-cost access to law. Legally trained people would
still be necessary in the minimal sense that code writers and digital
engineers would need to work with them to create the apps, but after
that their job would be done, and their handiwork would take over the
downstream business.
How far can digitized law go? It might be thought that only a tiny
subset of legal problems could be solved this way, namely the
problems in which legal thinking can be modeled as a decision tree.
But this conclusion underestimates the power of artificial intelligence
(“AI”). One interesting insight of AI experts is that far more subtle
forms of thinking like a lawyer might also be coded into algorithms.
The Eureka! moment came, not when Deep Blue beat Garry Kas-
parov at chess, but when Deep Blue’s younger cousin Watson beat the
world Jeopardy champion. Unlike chess, Jeopardy is a game played in
natural language requiring knowledge of the wider world outside the
game. Watson was able to match key phrases in the Jeopardy clues
with an inhumanly vast corpus of natural-language utterances. Attack-
24. See, e.g., Technology in Legal Practice, VAND. L. SCH., http://law.vanderbilt
.edu/courses/340 [https://perma.cc/D5EM-R5W6] (showing Vanderbilt’s course infor-
mation for Mark Jenkins’s “Technology in Legal Practice” course).
25. See VA. LEGAL AID SOC’Y, https://applications.neotalogic.com/a/vlas-eligibil-
ity [https://perma.cc/M6JZ-Y5FB]; see also Student-Designed Apps Provide Access to
Justice, supra note 19.
26. See David E. Boelzner, Law Students Participate in Veterans Law-Technology
Course, VETERANS L. J., Spring 2015, at 5, http://www.cavcbar.net/SPRING%202015
%20VLJ.pdf [https://perma.cc/J85W-DENM].
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ing each problem with multiple data-mining algorithms, Watson could
produce a winning guess in seconds.27
It quickly dawned on observers that Watson’s method is very much
like what trained professional experts do when they confront
problems. Medical diagnosticians like television’s Dr. House search
their memories for bits of information matching the symptoms and
test results—and medical diagnosticians were among the first to ap-
preciate the promise of Watson’s achievement. Dr. House has
thousands of disease patterns in his memory; Watson can effortlessly
store millions. Currently, Watson is being “trained” as a cancer spe-
cialist, with extremely promising results.28
Very likely, the search-and-match-and-guess method is what law-
yers do too. They match fact patterns with the thousands they have
confronted from the moment they read Payne v. Cave in their first
hour as a law student. That’s how they recognize the client’s problem
as a contracts problem or a fraud problem or a public benefits prob-
lem. Perhaps, then, that mystical and evanescent thing we call “think-
ing like a lawyer”—the know-how that we law teachers see our
students mastering somewhere in the middle of their second year—is
something that a very smart machine could be trained to do. Like
Ronald Dworkin’s mythical Judge Hercules,29 the machine can store
entire law libraries in its memory. Certainly it won’t happen today,
and maybe not tomorrow—but technology moves fast, and it took
only five years to develop the machine that now holds the world Jeop-
ardy crown. Lawyers who nervously watch litigation associates re-
placed by computers in document review should have a proper sense
of respect for Watson and its offspring—tempered, perhaps, with anx-
ious dismay at the brave new world. In the access to justice debates,
we should recognize that what is bad for the livelihoods of litigation
associates might become a boon for clients, as cutting edge software
gets cheaper and makes its way onto your smartphone.
The discourse of optimism sees technology solving the problem of
access to law. Are the optimists right? Nowadays, we’re inclined to a
kind of breathlessness in the face of the Digital Revolution. For my
part, I confess that I am not a true believer in the brave new world
where life’s enduring problems are slain by killer apps. But the claims
of hi-tech enthusiasts certainly have the salutary effect of forcing us to
reflect on what constitutes legal judgment. They ask a challenging
27. See, e.g., Jo Best, IBM Watson: The Inside Story of How the Jeopardy-Winning
Supercomputer Was Born, and What It Wants to Do Next, TECHREPUBLIC, http://www
.techrepublic.com/article/ibm-watson-the-inside-story-of-how-the-jeopardy-winning-
supercomputer-was-born-and-what-it-wants-to-do-next/ [https://perma.cc/Q6M6-
GJBC].
28. Ariana Eunjung Cha, Watson’s Next Feat? Taking on Cancer, WASH. POST,
June 28, 2015, at A1.
29. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105 (1978) (introducing
Judge Hercules).
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question: What does a human legal adviser have to offer that a smart
machine can’t be trained to do?
The first thing, it seems to me, is emotional intelligence. Civil justice
deficits are not simply information problems. They are emotional
problems as well, and dealing with those emotions—the fears, stresses,
and anxieties that Rebecca Sandefur’s survey subjects report30—may
be an essential part of the legal solution. Let me illustrate with a per-
sonal example.
Drawing up a simple will is often viewed as a paradigm case of rou-
tine legal service that might not require a trained lawyer. Perhaps peo-
ple could download a simple form together with an app that walks
them through the process of filling it out. Many people buy off-the-
shelf standardized forms to make their wills.
Yet one of my most vivid memories is how emotionally fraught it
was when, years ago, my wife and I made our first will. We did not
expect it to be; we thought it would be cut and dried. At the time, we
had two small kids and for all practical purposes no assets to pass on
to them except our life insurance—no savings and next to no home
equity. We went to an estates lawyer, Adena, who started asking ques-
tions that, in some sense, a computer could have asked as well. Who
do you want to leave the money to? What if David dies first? What if
Judy dies first? So far, so mechanical. Then came the first difficult one:
what if you both die, perhaps simultaneously in an accident? Who do
you want to raise your kids?
Then came some even less comfortable questions. Is that the same
person you want to name as executor to your will? Do you want some
of your insurance money to go to the step-parents, so they can buy a
bigger house to make room for the newcomers? And what if your
insurance money means your kids are more comfortably set up than
their kids? Do you want some of the money to go to the step-parents’
kids, for the sake of family harmony?
It should be obvious that these are deep questions. Who do you
trust with your kids? Are they the same people you love? Are they
your relatives, or someone else? If you leave your children in the care
of someone else, will your relatives be bitter at being passed over,
poisoning their relationship with the children? And one background
issue hovers over everything: Do you really want to think about car
crashes, tragedy, your death, your wife’s death, your children as heart-
stricken orphans? As Tom Shaffer wrote in one of his most beautiful
legal ethics articles, estate planning inevitably deals with “deep family
things.”31 Estates lawyers have told me that their clients often procras-
30. Sandefur, supra note 13, at 9–10.
31. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV.
963, 976 (1987).
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tinate executing their wills for months, simply because human beings
are not very good at confronting our own deaths.
Obviously, the fact that we were sitting in Adena’s office shows we
had thought about our deaths in at least an abstract prudential way.
But her job was to make the abstraction real. It was a surprisingly
hard conversation, which she managed with skill and kindness and
finesse.
The point here is simple. In theory, an automaton could have
walked us through the same questions Adena asked. The decision tree
for a simple will is no more complex than TurboTax. But in real life, it
took a skilled human being to manage the conversation so that we
would and could deal with the hard questions rationally. When I com-
plimented her psychological skills, Adena shrugged it off. “Well, law-
yers don’t go into my line of practice if they can’t work with people on
that level.” In other words: sometimes this seemingly cut-and-dried
process of making a simple will takes a mensch, not an app.
One obvious objection to what I have been saying is that not every
lawyer is an Adena. We all know lawyers with less empathy and emo-
tional intelligence than the average housecat; they’re called “part-
ners.” In fact, didn’t your contracts teacher try her damnedest to beat
the empathy out of you by making you argue the coal company’s side
in Peevyhouse in your third week of law school?32
Even so, it still seems to me that the least emotionally intelligent
human being is better at it than the smartest smartphone will ever be.
Even the fascinating AI experiments in machine analysis of facial ex-
pressions don’t persuade me that a machine could ever do what
Adena did on our simple will: talk us through our own mortality
calmly.33
Part of the reason is that human beings can have moral authority,
and machines have none. After all, in Shaffer’s terms, what Adena did
was conduct a moral conversation with us about two deep things:
death and property. Moral sense is not quite the same as emotional
intelligence, but it is an indispensible piece of legal judgment and legal
advice.
Next consider a very different example of a moral conversation that
I believe needs a human, not a computer. The example comes cour-
tesy of my colleague David Vladeck, who for four years ran the Fed-
eral Trade Commission’s Consumer Protection Bureau. One of the
32. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962).
33. See, e.g., Maja Pantic, Machine Analysis of Facial Behaviour: Naturalistic and
Dynamic Behaviour, 364 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 3453 (Dec. 2009),
http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/364/1535/3505 [https://perma.cc/4WAG-
ACU4]; Maja Pantic & Marian Stewart Bartlett, Machine Analysis of Facial Expres-
sions, in FACE RECOGNITION 377 (Kresimir Delac & Mislav Grgic, eds., 2007), http://
www.emotient.com/wp-content/uploads/Pantic_MachineAnalysis_2007.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CV4N-SJKZ].
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issues that most concerned the FTC was one I mentioned earlier: the
tsunami of debt that has washed over middle- and lower-income peo-
ple since the financial crash, causing untold misery.
A great deal of this debt is legally uncollectible because it has run
the statute of limitations. Most debtors know nothing about the stat-
ute of limitations, and unsurprisingly, debt collectors are in no hurry
to tell them. The law prohibits a creditor from suing or threatening to
sue to collect a time-barred debt, although I suspect it happens all the
time; but the law does not require them to tell the debtors that their
debt is time-barred and that, as a result, they do not have to pay. Nor
do creditors need to warn them that even a tiny partial payment—
indeed, even a verbal agreement to pay in order to get that hectoring
collection agency off the phone—waives the statute of limitations de-
fense. In these cases, even minimal information about the law could
save debtors from ruin. This is the kind of information one would sup-
pose could easily be provided on-line by a suitably designed app.
One problem is that the debtor population is not composed of tech-
savvy millennials, but in many cases uneducated working people who
do not know English very well and do not solve daily problems by
downloading apps. But the FTC discovered another, quite unexpected
obstacle to legal relief: many debtors do not believe in the statute of
limitations. They believe that if they owe an honest debt, they must
repay it, time-barred or not.
Here is where a conversation with a living, breathing human being
can do things that the Internet cannot. A legal professional can talk
through the moral issue with the client. She can explain what the stat-
ute of limitations is for. She can explain that the original creditor
wrote off the debt long ago, and indeed went belly up because of un-
sound lending practices. She can explain that the debt buyer paid only
a few cents on the dollar for it at a Resolution Trust Corporation auc-
tion; that the reason the buyers got it so cheap was they knew it was
uncollectible but were betting they could inveigle enough debtors into
paying anyway. She can explain that often, the debt buyers do not
even know that the Michael Smith they are dunning for money is the
wrong Michael Smith; they don’t much care, and the name is common.
And chances are that quite a few wrongly identified Michael Smiths
owe money to someone somewhere, and mistakenly suppose the debt
they’re being dunned for is really theirs. The legal advisor can vividly
remind the client about loved ones to whom he has financial responsi-
bilities. And then she can ask him the big question: Knowing all this,
are you still sure you want to pay debt the law does not require you to
pay?
Michael Smith might not budge: in his mind, a debt is a debt, end of
story. In that case, a lawyer must respect that moral choice, but at
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least she will have made sure her client made it eyes wide open.34 And
one could expect that many clients will change their minds; after all,
the reason they came to the lawyer is unmanageable debt.
Here, the crucial difference between the human and the machine is
very simple: the human can talk back. She can offer counter-reasons
and moral suasion to the client’s reasons. More than a century ago,
Elihu Root wrote: “About half the practice of a decent lawyer consists
in telling would-be clients that they are damned fools and should
stop.”35 Having someone tell us we’re being damn fools is a crucial
check on our own bad judgment that every one of us needs.
So far I have mentioned two aspects of human judgment that we
should not expect technology to model, at least not anytime soon:
emotional intelligence, and the give-and-take of reasons, what might
be called dialogical rather than computational rationality. This does
not mean it is impossible in principle for silicon circuitry to do the job;
after all, neural circuitry does. But don’t hold your breath.
There is a third human ability that computers cannot model, and
that is human creativity. Human beings make intuitive leaps to solve
problems. Technologies don’t. Those of you who read popular science
probably know that the million-dollar unanswered question in com-
puter science is whether every problem whose solution can be al-
gorithmically verified by a fast computer can, therefore, be
algorithmically solved by a fast computer.36 Many computer scientists
think the answer is no. If they’re right, it shows that problem solving
involves something more than rote calculation, even by the fastest
machines.
In sum, technological optimism should be tempered by a realistic
understanding of which parts of human judgment can be machine
modeled and which parts cannot. My argument has been that even if
technology can excel at a surprising amount of legal analysis, real legal
problems will often require human, not technological, solutions. The
same is true in medicine. Itifat Hussain, who directs the mobile app
curriculum at Wake Forest Medical School, strongly believes machines
will never supplant human doctors completely, because computers
lack human instincts and empathy.37 As Hussain explains:
34. The client, not the lawyer, sets the goals of representation. MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
35. PHILIP C. JESSUP, 1 ELIHU ROOT 133 (1938).
36. This is the so-called P = NP problem. P is the class of problems that are easy to
solve; NP is the class of problems that are easy to check. Hence the question: does P =
NP? The Clay Mathematics Institute has offered a million dollars to anyone who can
solve it. See Rules for the Millennium Prizes, CLAY MATHEMATICS INST., http://www
.claymath.org/millennium-problems/rules-millennium-prizes [https://perma.cc/7B2X-
9QUF]; see also P vs NP Problem, CLAY MATHEMATICS INST., http://www.claymath
.org/millennium-problems/p-vs-np-problem [https://perma.cc/QVH8-N5SF] (provid-
ing an informal explanation as well as a technically precise formulation of the
problem).
37. Cha, supra note 28, at A6.
508 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3
“There are a lot of things you can deduce by what a patient is not
telling you, how they interact with their families, their mood, their
mannerisms. They [i.e., computers] don’t look at the patient as a
whole,” Hussain said. “This is where algorithms fail you.”38
The argument also reveals something noteworthy about legal edu-
cation. The aspects of human judgment that machines cannot repli-
cate—emotional intelligence, moral give-and-take (and knowing when
to engage in it), and creativity—are conspicuously absent from the
standard legal curriculum. Some law schools offer courses on inter-
viewing and counseling, and many law school clinics teach it. A few
law schools offer courses on problem solving. But these are marginal
parts of the standard curriculum, as marginal as the course on admi-
ralty. If my arguments about human and artificial intelligence are
valid, instruction in counseling skills should be central to legal
education.
The takeaway point is that access to law sometimes is equivalent to
access to a flesh-and-blood legal professional.
III. ACCESS TO PROFESSIONAL LEGAL SERVICES =
ACCESS TO LAWYERS?
Next let’s turn to the second equivalence, between access to legal
professionals and access to lawyers. Is it sound?
Scholars and consumer organizations have been arguing for years
that it is not. Non-lawyer professionals may be fully capable of deliv-
ering high-quality legal services in specialty contexts. The trouble is
that for decades the bar has ruthlessly tried to suppress nonlawyer
competition, using unauthorized practice laws to bludgeon lay com-
petitors out of the market. The unauthorized practice regime chokes
off access to justice and serves primarily as protectionism for lawyers.
This critique is a long-time theme of my friend and co-author
Deborah Rhode, one of the nation’s deepest students of access to jus-
tice.39 And Deborah is right. A lot of legal problems can be solved by
paralegals, and legal aid organizations already use paralegals to
stretch their thin resources. As most of you know, Washington state
has pioneered a program of licensed legal technicians: limited-purpose
legal services providers trained in a handful of very particular legal
specialties that do not require a generalist law background.40 As the
bar has grudgingly come to accept unbundled and limited-purpose le-
38. Id.
39. It is a theme from her first publication to her most recent book on the legal
profession. Deborah L. Rhode & Ralph C. Cavanagh, Project, The Unauthorized
Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104 (1976);
DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 41–51 (2015).
40. Limited License Legal Technician Program, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, http://
www.wsba.org/licensing-and-lawyer-conduct/limited-licenses/legal-technicians [https:/
/perma.cc/9L37-GTTL].
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gal representations by lawyers, the need for a fully-trained, barred le-
gal generalist becomes harder to justify. These are well-known
themes, and I won’t say more about them now.
Instead, I wish to turn to the Greiner-Pattanayak-Hennessy studies
mentioned earlier. That is because the first study seems to show some-
thing very unexpected: that offers of legal services by highly commit-
ted, top-notch law students make no difference to client outcomes in
unemployment benefits appeals in Massachusetts. Maybe lawyers
aren’t really necessary.
Greiner and Pattanayak certainly do not go that far, by a long shot.
Their conclusions are cautious, and they take care not to over-genera-
lize; indeed, the only axe they have to grind is that studies of lawyer
efficacy are not careful enough. Their theme is that the only gold stan-
dard for studying the effectiveness of legal services is randomized
studies like theirs. As a result, in their view virtually all past efforts to
study effectiveness are worthless; that is their only polemical claim.
But the fear is that many readers will miss this caution flag. For
careless readers, the four simple words no difference in outcomes are
the takeaway. If there is no difference in outcomes between offers of
legal representation and no offers, why think lawyers are so
indispensible?
Many members of the legal aid community—perhaps fearing that
the study would become propaganda fodder for political attacks on
legal aid—complained that Greiner and Pattanayak asked the wrong
question. They did not compare outcomes of represented versus un-
represented people; rather, they compared outcomes of people who
had been offered legal assistance to people whose request for legal
help was turned down.41 Greiner and Pattanayak freely concede that
some of those people found assistance elsewhere. So maybe represen-
tation really does make a decisive difference.
But I do not agree that Greiner and Pattanayak asked the wrong
question. If the access to justice movement’s goal is making legal aid
available to those facing legal issues, asking whether an offer of legal
aid makes a difference is very much to the point, because all that legal
services providers can do is offer aid. If offers of aid make no differ-
ence in outcome, then perhaps expanding capacity is less vital than we
think.
Why weren’t the outcomes different between the treated group and
the control group? Greiner and Pattanayak offer some hypotheses
that make sense. Maybe unemployment appeals are unusually easy to
do pro se, or maybe the judges cut some slack for pro se litigants. The
authors’ main speculation, though, is that the kind of people who get
41. Jeffrey Selbin et al., Service Delivery, Resource Allocation, and Access to Jus-
tice: Greiner and Pattanayak and the Research Imperative, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 45,
49–51 (2012).
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it together to apply to the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau (“HLAB”) are
already a self-selected subset on the upper tail of the curve in terms of
initiative and organization. They are “go-getters.”
The best evidence for that hypothesis is that the win rate for mem-
bers of the control group not offered HLAB representation was sub-
stantially higher than the statewide average: 65% rather than 47% on
appeals, 83% rather than 75% defending employer appeals.42 If so, it
shows—paradoxically—that the people who show up at the door of a
legal aid office are probably not the people who need it most. That is a
paradox worth thinking about, although this Article does not explore
it further.
One noteworthy part of the Greiner-Pattanayak study is their point
that many of those in the control group who got no offer of help from
the Bureau may have obtained legal aid elsewhere and achieved their
good outcomes that way. A critic of legal aid might conclude that if so,
the need to offer more legal aid might be exaggerated because, with-
out it, people can find help elsewhere. But that conclusion (which, I
emphasize, is not one Greiner and Pattanayak draw) rests on a fallacy.
First, to say that a low-income person denied legal aid by A will find it
from B assumes there is a B to find it from—but the well of legal
services providers affordable by low-income clients is not a deep one,
and legal aid critics want to make it shallower. Second, the fact that
alternative legal aid is available locally cannot be scaled up to the con-
clusion that alternative legal aid is available globally, because across
the nation there are simply not enough providers. So the upshot of the
Greiner-Pattanayak study might be very hard to generalize—as they
themselves insist.
Further, their two subsequent studies, done with third co-author
John Hennessey, confirm just that and paint a very different picture of
the efficacy of lawyers. Both studies involved low-income tenants de-
fending against evictions. The first, done in a state district court, com-
pared outcomes between tenants who received only limited
unbundled assistance in the form of how-to sessions for self-help, and
those who got legal representation as well. Here, the difference be-
tween lawyer-represented tenants and unrepresented tenants was dra-
matic: tenants with lawyers prevailed twice as often as those without.
So, if the first Greiner-Pattanayak study stands for the proposition
that offers of legal aid do not matter as much as we might suppose, the
District Court Study supports the conclusion that lawyers matter a lot.
But not so fast. The second eviction study, done in a specialty hous-
ing court rather than a district court, yielded a very different outcome
from the first. In this study, tenants in the control group got an addi-
tional form of unbundled assistance besides self-help training, namely
help by a lawyer on the day of the hearing in the form of hallway
42. Greiner & Pattanayak, Legal Aid Bureau Study, supra note 14, at 2173.
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settlement negotiations and mediations. Tenants in the treated group
were offered full-fledged legal representation. And here, unlike the
District Court Study but like the Harvard Study, the finding was no
difference at all in outcomes.
How do we interpret these dramatic differences in results? One di-
agnosis of the two eviction studies is that a little lawyer goes a long
way: in the District Court Study the unbundled legal service did not
include representation, but in the Housing Court Study it did. Maybe
even modest and limited help from lawyers made the difference. If so,
it provides a strong argument for unbundling legal services by lawyers.
Unfortunately for the bragging rights of lawyers, another explana-
tion seems all too likely: the outcomes did not differ much in housing
court because the full-service attorneys were not aggressive enough.
Even though the average fully represented tenant got almost 11 more
hours of legal help than those receiving unbundled representation, the
full-service lawyers “pursued a risk-averse representation style de-
signed to [facilitate a] settlement, as opposed to a high risk, aggres-
sive, or confrontational style designed to put pressure [on] an
opposing party.”43 The treated group “saw an average of .18 prejudg-
ment motions per case versus .16 for the control” and the demand for
jury trials in the treated group was also only 18%.44 In other words,
the full-service lawyers seldom filed motions or demanded jury trials.
They saw their job as simply working out settlements. By comparison,
the full-service attorneys in the District Court Study filed motions and
demanded jury trials in an average of more than 80% of the cases.45
That’s four and a half times as often as their counterparts in Housing
Court.46 Perhaps it is not surprising that when the smoke had cleared,
their clients kept possession of their dwellings twice as often as those
in the Housing Court Study.
In keeping with their cautious, evidence-based approach Greiner
and his co-authors are reluctant to draw conclusions their analysis
cannot prove: they insist their conjecture that zealous advocacy made
the difference is sheer speculation.47 But it is plausible speculation.
What lessons can we draw from these very sophisticated studies?
First is the lesson that Greiner and his co-authors consider to be their
main conclusion: analyses of legal services programs should be rigor-
ous and evidence-based. Their reluctance to speculate and prognosti-
cate beyond what the data shows is skepticism at its best. Second, the
very disparate results of the studies suggest that context matters enor-
mously. Third, the two eviction studies by no means underwrite skep-
ticism about the value of lawyers—the conclusion that some might
43. Greiner, Pattanayak, & Hennessy, Housing Court Study, supra note 14, at 23.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 44.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 40.
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have drawn from the unemployment study. If anything, the eviction
studies might make us appreciate the value of a zealous lawyer even
more. And so, like the discourse of optimism, the discourse of skepti-
cism has its limits.
IV. ACCESS TO JUSTICE = ACCESS TO LAW?
The third of the equivalences that define the access to justice move-
ment raises the question: Does access to justice really mean access to
law, that is, access to legal justice?
Clearly, it depends on what you mean by non- or extra-legal justice.
Obviously, access to legal justice will seldom create the beatific vision
of social justice that, in the words of Martin Luther King and the bibli-
cal prophet Amos, should roll down on us like waters in a mighty
stream.48 Amos inveighs against those who trample upon the poor,
afflict the righteous, and turn aside the needy at the gate. Unfortu-
nately, legal justice may do all the things that Amos condemns, for
legal justice enforces unjust laws as well as just. The Bible also cau-
tions us: “You shall not pervert justice, either by favouring the poor or
by subservience to the great.”49 If distributive and social justice re-
quires favoring the poor far more than the law currently does—which
is certainly what I believe!—access to law may have little to do with
justice. In any event, legal aid is seldom the instrument of large-scale
change in the basic distributive structure of society. It will not institute
John Rawls’s difference principle, or eliminate the New Gilded Age
economic inequality Thomas Piketty warns about.
Mostly, access to legal justice works at the molecular level, not the
molar. It means not only possessing legal personality but also having
the wherewithal to go to court or apply for benefits. It means being
able to work the levers of the law out of court, by making a will, get-
ting a permit to open a store, adopting a child, or getting an Earned
Income Tax Credit. None of these things is Justice with a capital “J,”
but obviously, they matter to the people they matter to.
The lack of full congruence between justice and law also crops up
when we turn from macro-justice—Justice with a capital “J”—to what
we might call micro-justice: justice between persons, especially in in-
terpersonal disputes. For Aristotle, justice is not fundamentally about
an abstract distribution of goods and rights—it is a personal virtue,
and “the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality.”50
That is because, for Aristotle, both justice and friendship mean look-
ing out for the interests of others. One of the most common com-
48. Amos 5:24 (New English Bible); Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream,
Speech Delivered at the Lincoln Memorial (Aug. 28, 1963), in A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE 217–20 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986).
49. Leviticus 19:15 (New English Bible).
50. Aristotle, Nicomachaean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1059
(Richard McKeon, ed., 1941), bk. 8, ch. 1, 1155a26-29.
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plaints about excessive legalism and rights-consciousness, shared by
communitarians on the left and the right, is that it undermines the
basis for social solidarity, the kind of collective friendship that Aris-
totle believed lies at the very foundation of political communities.51
One view of justice emphasizes restorative justice and reconciliation—
the mending of broken relationships—and not legalistic justice. That
view is not only communitarian; it also reflects an important strand of
feminist thought, the ethic of care developed by Carol Gilligan.52 We
should not expect law to help much in justice, as it is understood in
Aristotle’s or Gilligan’s terms.
There is another way, though, that justice clearly requires access to
law. Access to law is itself a distributive good that is closely tied not
only to the protection of basic rights but also to human dignity. And
exclusion from the law is in itself a form of injustice. Practically, it puts
America’s neediest people in peril of losing their homes, apartments,
and basic entitlements. But, more abstractly, it also deprives them of
the equal respect and concern that Ronald Dworkin taught us is the
fundamental virtue of law.53
That too was part of Dr. King’s message, when he denounced une-
qual laws as “difference made legal.”54 Difference made legal, King
argued, is a violation of natural law—a violation that just men and
women are obligated to resist. It is, after all, one of the things the
prophet Amos denounces: turning aside the needy at the gate, which
surely includes the gate to full and equal protection of the law. Access
to law may not yield justice in either the macro-sense we associate
with Rawls or Piketty nor Aristotle’s and Gilligan’s sense of the virtue
that lies at the foundation of collective friendship.
But sometimes a lawyer can ward off tangible injustices, and guard
vulnerable people at the brink of the precipice. Whenever that hap-
pens, the equivalences we have been examining—between access to
justice, access to legal justice, access to legal assistance, and access to
lawyers—take on concrete reality, regardless of their conceptual and
practical differences. Those moments of convergence are among the
most rewarding that lawyers experience. And that is enough to make
access to justice worth reconsidering at law schools.
51. Aristotle, Politics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 50, at
1189, bk. 3, ch. 9, 1280b38.
52. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT 74 (1982).
53. DWORKIN, supra note 29, at 184–205.
54. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail (Apr. 16, 1963),
supra note 48, at 289–302.
